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Risk management aims to reduce the costs of adverse events.  In entities such as 
hospitals, risk managers do this in two ways:  reducing the likelihood or seriousness of 
adverse events and reducing the costs of these events when they do happen.  Activities 
aimed at the latter present direct conflicts of interest between protecting the institution 
and respecting the interests of the clients served by the institution—so-called institutional 
conflicts of interest. Activities aimed at the former would appear to benefit all parties--
those at risk of accidents (because the risk is reduced) and the institution (because 
reducing risks also reduces the costs of adverse events)--and thus escape problems of 
conflicts.  This appearance may also misleading, however, if efforts to reduce risks to 
agents of the institution (such as hospital staff) conflict indirectly with efforts to reduce 
risks to clients (such as patients). Here, too, institutional conflicts of interest may arise for 
the risk manager.   
 This chapter discusses the role of the risk manager in handling institutional 
conflicts of interest in health care organizations. When risk managers attempt to reduce 
the costs of adverse events to the institution, conflicts of interest are likely to arise and to 
present ethical issues for the risk manager. These conflicts are institutional ones that are 
built into the risk manager’s role:  the risk manager’s goal is to settle potentially 
expensive claims on terms that are favorable to the institution rather than on the terms 





In the play, “An Enemy of the People,” Ibsen’s character Dr. Thomas Stockmann informs 
local officials that their town’s well-known and highly lucrative baths are contaminated 
by runoff from a local tannery.  Stockmann is the chief medical officer for the baths, 
much sought after for their healing capabilities.  After observing unusual episodes of 
illness in some of the baths’ visitors, Stockmann sends water samples off for analysis to a 
major university.  When the results indicate contamination, he urges closure of the baths 
to protect the health of visitors—a judgment based on his assessment of the risks and 
benefits of leaving the baths open.  
 Ibsen’s play is a classic drama of honesty and self-righteousness against 
community spirit and greed—with all the subtle strengths and weaknesses of each of 
these.  But it is also a prescient drama about the role of a public health risk manager and 
the individual and social conflicts attending that role.  As an individual, Stockmann 
prides himself on being a scientist and taking care to withhold his concerns from the 
community until he has confirmed test results. Yet there is also a ring of “I told you so” 
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in how he conveys the news to the town officials; Stockmann had argued for a more 
expensive piping system that would have avoided the risk of pollution contamination of 
the baths.  Although Stockmann expects to be a town hero for what he has learned, it 
comes as no surprise to the audience that he is disbelieved, dismissed from his position, 
evicted from his home, and declared an “enemy of the people.”  
 In the play, Ibsen draws a masterful portrait of conflicts of interest: Stockmann 
has interests in his scientific reputation, his family, his position as medical director, and 
his medical practice.  The town has financial interests in the success of the baths and in 
its reputation.  The town leaders have interests in their positions with the town as well as 
their own economic interests.  But there is more.  At the end of the play, Stockmann is 
confronted with perhaps the most traditional form of conflict of interest:  he learns that 
the owner of the tannery, his wife’s adoptive father, was planning to leave a sizeable 
inheritance to Stockmann’s wife and children.  To pressure Stockmann to clear the 
tannery of responsibility for the pollution, his adoptive father-in-law has invested his 
fortune in the baths and tells Stockmann that unless the baths are cleared, he will leave 
the fortune to a charity.  Deprived of income with which to support his family, 
Stockmann faces a “horribly painful dilemma,” deepened by the recognition that some 
believe that he has criticized the baths so that his adoptive father in law could profiteer 
from investing in the baths on highly favorable terms. Yet Stockmann remains pure:  he 
refuses the inheritance and plans to provide medical care for the poor in the town.  
Ibsen’s play was written over one hundred years ago, but healthcare risk managers face 
many of these same conflicts of interest today. 
 This chapter begins with a discussion of conflicts of interest, both individual and 
institutional.  It then considers the role of the healthcare risk manager and explains how 
that role may incorporate institutional conflicts of interest.  The chapter then applies this 
analysis to the role of the risk manager in disclosure or apology programs designed to 
reduce malpractice costs.  It concludes with three suggestions for alleviating these 
conflicts of interest: limitations on confidentiality requirements in settlement agreements, 
a requirement that patients receive independent advice before entering these agreements, 
and development of the capability for independent review of settlements. 
 
Understanding Conflicts of Interest 
 
Understood most broadly, conflicts of interest in the professional context occur when 
judgments about the exercise of professional obligations are, or might be, affected unduly 
by interests extrinsic to professional relationships.  One influential characterization of this 
situation is that “secondary” interests adversely affect “primary” professional interests. 
(Thompson 1993)  Identifying such conflicts thus requires a determination of 
professional obligations as primary interests, an understanding of what interests are 
extrinsic to the professional relationship and thus secondary, and judgments about when 
such secondary interests affect or might affect professionals in ways they should not. 
 Some professions such as law have developed highly formalized statements of 
professional obligations and how various conflicts of interest may affect them; 
disciplinary mechanisms may be invoked when actions violate these obligations.  Other 
professions have far less elaborate professional codes.  Unlike law or medicine, many 
professions—including healthcare risk management in most states—do not require 
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licensure—a common method for the enforcement of professional obligations.  In many 
fields, moreover, contractual obligations to employers such as confidentiality, non-
compete clauses, or agreements to limit services, may lie in uneasy tension with primary 
profession obligations or other secondary interests. 
 As will be discussed more fully below, there may also be no clear delineation of 
which interests are considered secondary to the professional relationship.  Personal 
financial interests and interests of family members are standardly identified as such 
interests. (Lo & Fried 2009, p. 32) General ideological orientations or political 
affiliations are frequently not judged to be conflictual interests, even though they may 
affect decision-making, unless they can be linked directly to some form of personal 
advantage.  Interests in reputation, public recognition, or career advancement may be as 
influential on decision-making but far more difficult to identify than financial interests. 
(Thompson 1993)  They thus may be considered secondary interests although they are 
often not addressed directly in professional codes of conduct or conflicts of interest 
policies. 
 Secondary interests are not problematic per se.  They may become problematic 
when they divert judgment in the context of professional relationships.  Thompson (1993) 
writes: 
 
The secondary interest is usually not illegitimate in itself, and indeed it 
may even be a necessary and desirable part of professional practice. Only 
its relative weight in professional decisions is problematic. The aim is not 
to eliminate or necessarily to reduce financial gain or other secondary 
interests (such as preference for family and friends or the desire for 
prestige and power). It is rather to prevent these secondary factors from 
dominating or appearing to dominate the relevant primary interest in the 
making of professional decisions. 
 
 In healthcare, observational research has addressed correlations between 
individual economic interests of physicians and treatment recommendations. (Lo & Fried 
2009, Ch. 6)  Such research also reveals correlations between relationships with 
pharmaceutical companies and other commercial enterprises and published research 
findings.  (Lo & Fried 2009, Ch. 4) When the interests of patients or human subjects are 
compromised, the influence of conflicts of interest is clearly problematic.  A well-known 
illustration is the death of Jesse Gelsinger, a participant who died in a trial of gene 
therapy at the University of Pennsylvania.  The study’s lead researcher had substantial 
financial interests in the company that would profit if the trials were successful—interests 
that were valued at least $13.5 million and perhaps much more. (Wilson 2010) The 
University also had equity interests in the company and financial interests in continuing 
to receive research support from the company.  Indeed, the researcher was permitted to 
have such large financial interests in an agreement that supposedly shielded him from 
making scientific decisions and provided the University with the relationship with the 
company.  Neither Jesse Gelsinger nor his family were informed of the extent of the 
financial ties or of potential risks of the study that had become apparent in earlier trials 
using animals as well as with earlier patients in the study. (Wilson 2010) The firestorm of 
criticism that followed Gelsinger’s death in the trial focused primarily on these financial 
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ties—but reputational, career, and institutional interests may also have played important 
roles in the tragedy, so much so that Wilson (2010) argues that prohibition of the 
financial ties might not have been all that was necessary. 
 Discussions of conflicts of interest in healthcare increasingly recognize that 
institutional conflicts may exist in addition to individual conflicts (Rose 2013, Friedman 
& McKinney 2013, Lo & Field 2009; Emanuel & Steiner 1995) According to the 
Institute of Medicine, “Institutional conflicts of interest arise when an institution’s own 
interests or those of its senior officials pose risks of undue influence on decisions 
involving the institution’s primary interests” in the sense of obligations to those the 
institution serves (Lo & Field, 218)  Federal regulations regarding government ethics also 
recognize the reality of institutional conflicts of interest; government employees, even 
special government employees such as those serving on advisory committees or 
temporary employees on leave from other positions, must not participate in the 
development of policies that might have a distinct impact on their institutions other than 
as members of a general class of institutions. (18 C.F.R. § 2640.203 (2014)) The 
examples in these regulations cite financial concerns, such as the development of a grants 
and contracts policy. Federal regulations governing conflicts of interest in federally 
funded research likewise focus on the financial interests of researchers or persons in 
institutional positions of authority. (42 C.F.R. Part 50, 45 C.F.R. Part 94 (2014); 
Friedman & McKinney 2013). 
 Particularly as federal funding for biomedical research has become more limited, 
academic medical institutions have pursued ties with industry.  Concerns about 
maintaining the loyalty of commercial donors may impact decisions about faculty 
members and threaten the freedom to publish information critical of donors. (Shafer 
2003) Competition to retain well-funded faculty members and to pursue grant 
opportunities has intensified as well.  These are institutional—not individual—conflicts 
of interest and may require policies to address them (Friedman & McKinney 2013) or 
perhaps even restrict them. (Shafer 2003) Arguably, they may be as serious as individual 
conflicts of interest in diverting judgments away from the institution’s obligations to the 
individuals they serve.  (Lo & Fried 2009, p. 216)  However, regulations and institutional 
policies currently in place typically address institutional conflicts only as they are 
reflected in individual conflicts.  There are some exceptions; for example, Stanford 
University’s institutional conflict of interest policy states explicitly that if investigators at 
the University are engaged in research that may affect the University’s intellectual 
property rights or equity holdings, these properties will be sequestered in an account held 
by an independent third party.  (Stanford University 2014) 
 Conflict of interest rules seek to preserve the integrity of professional judgment 
and to maintain confidence in them.  (Thompson 1993)  Both individual and institutional 
conflicts of interest may result in a lack of trustworthiness and concomitantly 
inappropriately placed trust when those served by the institution do not realize that the 
institution’s interests are being placed first. (Rose 2013)   
 
The Roles of Healthcare Risk Managers  
 
Risk management in health care addresses the frequency, severity, and costs of adverse 
events.  It is still a relatively new and still evolving professional field.  Emerging in the 
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1970s in response to perceptions of a “malpractice crisis” of increased costs, the field 
originally sought to confront loss reduction directly by prevention and mitigation.  (Core 
Risk Services 2014)  The American Society for Healthcare Risk Management (ASHRM) 
was founded in 1980 as the American Society for Hospital Risk Managers and reflects 
these dual goals of increased safety and reduced institutional costs of errors or accidents. 
 One major way in which healthcare risk management is evolving as a field is its 
relation to and interconnection with quality improvement.  For the most part, the fields 
have developed along separate paths and employ different goals and methods. If the goal 
of risk management is reduction of losses due to malpractice claims, and the goal of 
quality improvement is patient safety and care quality, the two are distinct enterprises 
each with unique ethical concerns.  For example, the argument that it is appropriate to use 
patient data without consent for quality improvement activities as that might benefit their 
ongoing care or the care of patients like them cannot be applied as easily to the use of 
patient information to reduce liability costs. (Jennings et al. 2007, Baily et al. 2006)  Data 
analyses devoted to patient safety may prioritize identifying events that may affect many 
people but that are unlikely to result in high-cost litigation, whereas analyses devoted to 
loss prevention may prioritize efforts to prevent events that give rise to such litigation. 
On the other hand, to the extent that improved patient safety and care quality reduce 
malpractice costs—as they surely do at least to some extent—the goals of the two fields 
align.  Indeed, in many small healthcare facilities the same staff may perform both 
functions.  
 As concerns about patient safety and care quality have drawn increased attention, 
the need for connections between risk management and quality improvement activities 
has increasingly been emphasized. The publication of research about the frequency of 
medical errors (e.g. Leape 1994) highlighted problems of patient safety (IOM 1999) as 
well as the possibility that improved patient safety would reduce the costs of malpractice.  
The subsequent growth of the patient safety movement has led to recognition that risk 
management and care quality functions must work together. (ASHRM 2007)  A primary 
example of the disclosure, apology, and offer programs described below, that of the 
University of Michigan, incorporates risk manager analysis of whether care was 
reasonable and how unreasonable forms of care can be avoided.  The program assigns 
risk managers to particular clinical areas in order to carry out these patient safety 
activities.   (Boothman et al. 2009) Such efforts of healthcare risk managers directed to 
reducing the frequency or severity of adverse events or to improving care quality would 
appear to be aligned with the interests of patients.  To the extent that this alignment 
exists, interests of the healthcare facility and its patients are not in conflict. 
 In many other ways, however, interests of healthcare facilities and risk managers 
who work in them may be in conflict with the interests of patients. These conflicts and 
the ethical issues they create are the focus of the remainder of this chapter.  The next 
section outlines the ethical principles that have been developed for public and private risk 
managers and considers how they might function in the context of conflicts of interest 
between institutions and the patients they serve.  The chapter continues with an in depth 
discussion of an institutional conflict of interest that is arguably endemic in the role of the 
risk manager:  development of disclosure, apology, and offer programs designed to 
encourage early settlements in situations in which patients were harmed by medical 
errors.  A concluding section explores three possibilities for addressing this conflict: 
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limitations on confidentiality requirements in settlement agreements, a requirement that 
patients receive independent advice before entering these agreements, and development 
of the capability for independent review of settlements. 
 
Ethics for Healthcare Risk Managers 
 
The ASHRM Code of Professional Conduct (2012) divides risk manager responsibilities 
into two groups:  responsibilities to the profession and responsibilities to those they serve.  
In the framework for conflict of interest analysis given above, these responsibilities 
would be the primary interests of the risk manager.  
 Among responsibilities to the profession, the ASHRM Code lists identifying, 
acknowledging, and disclosing potential conflicts of interest.  Responsibilities to those 
served include respect by practicing in a non-discriminatory manner, recognizing that 
patients and their families are entitled to fair treatment, communicating honestly and 
factually, and sharing confidential information only where appropriate and permitted by 
law.  This set of responsibilities also emphasizes patient safety; responsibilities of the risk 
manager include investigating and analyzing events to reduce the likelihood of similar 
injury to others, promoting cultural change that encourages reporting events that might 
result in injury, and advocating for patient safety.   
 In a third section, the ASHRM Code discusses individual conflicts of interest in 
further detail.  This section singles out transactions with former employers or business 
associates, business transactions inuring to personal benefit or benefit of family members, 
and investments or activities which conflict or appear to conflict with the interests of 
employer or client as conflicts of interest for risk managers.  The Code judges that 
business transactions inuring to personal benefit are unacceptable even with disclosure; 
other potential conflicts require full disclosure but may be permissible.   
 The ASHRM Code’s treatment of conflicts of interest thus focuses on individual 
economic benefit or other individual benefits, not the possibility that the role of the risk 
manager may itself involve a conflict of interest between the interests of the healthcare 
institution and the interests of the patients it serves.  For the risk manager, the primary 
professional interests of providing patients and their families with fair treatment and 
communicating factually and honestly could be deflected by the secondary interests of 
the institution in reducing costs and the secondary interests of the risk manager him or 
herself in professional reputation, job security, and advancement.  In this individual 
focus, the ASHRM Code is not alone; official ethics statements for public risk managers 
take a similar stance.  The Public Risk Management Association, the association of risk 
managers in the public sector, has a Code of Ethics (2014) that gives these illustrations of 
prohibited conflicts of interest:  misuse of public resources, improper outside 
employment, acceptance of gifts or nepotism, and engagement in activities that will 
create a hostile work environment.  Yet contemporary discussions of institutional 
conflicts of interest note that the analysis applied to conflicts in research and patient 
treatment may also be relevant to other aspects of the healthcare enterprise. 
(Lo & Field 2009, p. 32) 
 
Disclosure Programs and Institutional Conflicts of Interest 
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A recent, highly praised strategy for healthcare institutions to reduce costs of malpractice 
litigation is to encourage early settlement through disclosure, apology, and offer to 
patients.  This strategy is proposed as a replacement for a “deny and defend” strategy 
seeking to win malpractice lawsuits. It has resulted in multiplicity of state laws shielding 
disclosures or apologies from litigation in a wide variety of ways. (Boothman et al. 2009)  
Important differences among such programs include whether they are disclosure only, 
whether they include apologies, and what kinds of disclosures are made.  For example, 
some programs merely acknowledge to the patient that an adverse event occurred that 
was related to their care, without in any way apologizing or admitting responsibility for 
the event. Others will say they were sorry for what occurred but take care not to link such 
expressions of sympathy with admissions of fault that might give rise to liability claims. 
 The contemporary apology movement began with a report of “humanistic” risk 
management policies at a Veterans Affairs medical center that reported reduced liability 
payments. (Kramen & Hamm 1999)  Although the study reported only a small case series 
and policy makers recognized that Veterans Affairs institutions might not be 
representative of healthcare institutions more generally, the reported findings generated 
great interest. In 2010, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) funded 
a series of demonstration projects testing the concept that early disclosure or errors might 
reduce litigation costs (Mello, Studdert & Kachalia 2014). One larger hospital system 
with a disclosure program that also received grants under the AHRQ program—the 
University of Michigan—has reported reduced claims frequency, transaction costs, 
incidence of litigation, and time to dispute resolution. (Boothman et al. 2009)  In 
addition, the Michigan experience reports a cultural shift to patient safety after inception 
of the disclosure program. (Boothman, Imhoff, & Campbell 2012) 
 Some published studies indicate reductions in litigation and settlement amounts 
after institution of a program of disclosure (Adams 2014).   Other studies suggest that the 
changes are more likely to occur with cultural changes within institutions rather than 
being associated with state law innovations.  (Perez & DiDona 2010)  These studies 
report data that might suggest changes that are in both the interests of patients and the 
interests of institutions, if institutions shift to a culture of patient safety that results in 
reduced frequency of costly errors.  On the other hand, reports of reduced costs may 
reflect reduced litigation costs and lower settlement offers to patients rather than concerns 
reflecting the interests of patients.  The impact of institutional conflicts of interests thus 
remains unclear from these studies. 
 To consider the extent to which institutional conflicts of interest may have been 
recognized or acknowledged in studies of apology or disclosure programs, or in reports of 
the programs themselves, I conducted a pubmed search for “apology and malpractice and 
date after 2000.”1 This search yielded a total of 42 articles.  Many of these cited other 
articles discussing apology and disclosure programs and I included these as well in my 
database. After excluding all articles reporting activities outside of the United States and 
articles about which no information was available (primarily trade publications or local 
bar journals), I then reviewed 35 articles for the following factors:  (1) did the article 





article express a view about whether disclosure or apology was likely to create an 
improved climate of patient safety or otherwise improve care? (3) did the article express a 
view about whether apology or disclosure was likely to reduce the costs of litigation? (4) 
did the article raise any questions about whether the patient’s interests were adequately 
represented in the process of settlement after apology or disclosure?   Full results of my 
analysis are presented in the table in appendix A. 
 Some of the articles were discussions of the apology and disclosure movement 
presented as information to particular medical specialties (e.g. Vercler, Buchman & 
Chung 2014, plastic surgeons; Sohn & Bal 2012, orthopedists; Surbone 2012, 
oncologists; Baker, Lauro & Sintim-Damoa 2008, radiologists).  Some articles focused 
on physician reluctance to disclosure and how this might be overcome (e.g. Surbone 
2012; Pelt & Faldmo 2008; Saxton & Finkelstein 2008); Wei 2007).  Many were articles 
in law reviews describing or assessing the impact of the different types of state apology 
and disclosure laws (e.g. Mello, Studdert & Kachalia 2014; Raper 2011; Hyman 2010; 
Mastroianni 2010; Perez & DiDona 2009; Robbinelt 2009; McDonnell & Guenther 
2008).  Three reported on the success of their institutional apology and disclosure 
programs (Boothman, Imhoff & Campbell 2012, University of Michigan; Quinn & 
Eichler 2008, Colorado COPIC program; Kraman et al. 2002, Lexington VA). 
 Ten articles raised questions about fair compensation for patients, several in ways 
that suggested sensitivity to the possibility of institutional conflicts of interest.  Articles 
portraying the University of Michigan program, for example, cited cost reductions as 
only an incidental advantage of an effort to create an environment of fairness and 
openness (Boothman, Imhoff & Campbell 2012; Chung et al. 2011).  Hyman (2010), 
cites data to the effect that patients report satisfaction with disclosure programs and do 
not report feeling pressured unfairly into settlements.  Several articles point out that 
physicians may have fiduciary responsibilities to their patients that are not shared by risk 
managers (Loren et al. 2010; Quinn & Eichner 2008).  Mello, Studdert & Kachalia 
(2014) note that compensation may be difficult to calculate fairly.  Chung et al. (2011) 
caution against the possibility that physicians and hospitals that are independent actors 
(and not covered under a single self-insured malpractice umbrella) may behave 
strategically in order to shift liability costs to others involved in care. 
 Two articles stood out in raising questions about the possible impact of disclosure 
programs on fairness to patients.  In a 2014 critical analysis of the impact of tort reform 
on liability costs, Mello, Studdert & Kachalia argue that tort reforms do not account for a 
significant percentage of the reduction in liability costs over the preceding decade.  
Instead, they argue that initial reports from the AHRQ demonstration projects suggest 
that programs communicating about injury with patients have had promising results.  
These authors note, however, that the proactive compensation component of these 
programs “may be more difficult for institutions to consistently execute” than 
communication, because insurers calculate compensation offers based on the likelihood 
of suit rather than on a principled analysis of whether substandard care caused harm.  In 
their study of disclosure, apology, and offer programs, Bell and coauthors (Bell et al. 
2010) conducted key informant interviews and found increased transparency, improved 
patient safety, reduced liability costs, and rapid and fair compensation as goals of these 
programs.  Informants also feared that these programs would be perceived as “anti-
consumer” efforts to settle cases quickly, for limited amounts, and without the benefit of 
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independent advice for patients.  In the judgment of this study’s authors, “Making whole 
those patients who have been harmed through medical negligence as quickly and fairly as 
possible after a harmful error diminishes any conflicts of interest on the part of the 
physician or the institution to help the patient while avoiding litigation and helps preserve 
therapeutic relationships between patients and caregivers.” (Bell et al. 2010, 694-95) 
 Despite raising the issue of compensation fairness, none of these articles 
conceptualized the possibility of institutional conflict of interest directly.  Importantly, 
none raised the possibility that risk managers might face this conflict in dealing with the 
disclosure process, making recommendations about settlement offers, or discussing 
compensation with patients. 
  
Conclusion:  Some Recommendations for Change 
 Despite their clear benefits, disclosure programs present possibilities of 
institutional conflicts of interest.  They may encourage patients to settle claims of injury 
for settlement amounts that are unfair.  Many discussions of these programs in the 
literature do not recognize these fairness concerns.  Others, while recognizing the 
possibility of unfairness, do not conceptualize it in terms of a conflict of interest.  In this 
conclusion, I suggest three additions to the disclosure process that might help to mitigate 
conflict of interest risks. 
 (1) Reminding the patient that they have an opportunity to seek outside counsel 
and that doing so might be beneficial to them. When attorneys representing clients 
consider entering into transactions with them, this is an attorney-client conflict of interest.  
In such cases, ethical rules require attorneys to tell their clients that they have an 
opportunity to seek outside counsel (ABA 2013).  The institutional conflicts of interest 
faced by the risk manager or others representing the health care provider are similar in 
structure.  Affording the opportunity for independent representation might thus be seen as 
an appropriate conflict-mitigation measure. 
 (2) Reconsidering the confidentiality of settlement agreements.  When settlements 
are reached during the course of litigation, a condition of the settlement is typically that 
the settlement amount will be kept secret.  This makes it difficult for patients and their 
representatives to know what others in similar circumstances may have received.  It also 
makes it difficult for researchers to scrutinize the fairness of settlement patterns.  
(Knutsen 2010)  Publication of settlement amounts in particular cases presents significant 
risks to patient privacy.  It also risks misleading others, as publication of settlement 
amounts will not reveal the unique features of individual cases.  On the other hand, 
publication of aggregate numbers such as how many settlements have been reached by 
the provider in a given year, in what categories of cases, and for what amounts, might 
increase transparency in a manner that supports public interests in improved care and 
fairness to patients. 
 (3) Establishing a mechanism for impartial review of disclosure, apology, and 
offer programs. In her review of the Jesse Gelsinger case, Wilson (2010) argues that 
banning institutional conflicts of interest would not have solved the problem of risks to 
patients that these pose.  Instead, she argues for an ongoing external review of these 
conflicts, much as data safety monitoring boards assess the risks to patients of clinical 
trials on an ongoing basis.  Along these lines, the University of Michigan disclosure, 
apology, and offer program features an internal review committee that assesses risk 
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manager determinations of whether the error in care was an unreasonable one before a 
settlement offer is made. This committee is designed to have a range of experts to counter 
the tendency to “protect ones own.” (Boothman et al. 2009)  As it is an internal 
committee, however, it does not fully mitigate the risks of institutional conflicts. 
 Apology, disclosure and offer programs have growing appeal.  Yet they present 
clear institutional conflicts of interest for risk managers.  These conflicts have been 
under-appreciated in published assessments of these programs.  Efforts to mitigate these 
conflicts should be further explored by risk managers. 
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